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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court ruled, and the City of Holladay argues here, that the notice
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act bar Heughs Land's state takings
claims, and that Heughs Land's federal takings claims are not ripe until the state claims
are fully adjudicated.
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is undisputedly self-executing. It is
this self-executing characteristic that vests citizens with immediate Judicially enforceable
rights arising from the taking of their private property and exempts the constitutional
provision from any legislation except for that which broadens the rights created
thereunder. The result sought by the City of Holladay would be the unconstitutional,
legislative narrowing of a self-executing constitutional right.
In Williamson County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court
held that "federal takings claims are not ripe for litigation until the claimant has sought
compensation from the state and been denied." 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985). Many courts
refuse to interpret Williamson as precluding state courts as an initial and concurrent
venue for federal takings claims. Heughs Land asks this Court to do the same.
ARGUMENT
I.

SELF-EXECUTING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS MAY NOT BE
LIMITED OR IN ANY WAY RESTRICTED BY LEGISLATION,
A,

The City of Holladay does not Contest that Article I, Section 22 of the
Utah Constitution is Self-Executing,

The City of Holladay presents not one case opposing the self-executing nature of
article I. section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
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It is this self-executing nature that prevents the rights arising under article I,
section 22 from being limited or in any way restricted by legislation such as the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Though there was a brief time when Utah jurisprudence
was ambivalent as to the nature of article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, modern
courts have made it unequivocally clear that this constitutional clause is self-executing.
See. e.g., Column v. Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622, 630 (Utah 1990) ("We now
reaffirm that article I, section 22 is self-executing."); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1244 n.l (Utah 1990) ("Recently, in Column v. Utah State
Land Bd. (citation omitted), we held that article I, section 22 was self-executing.");
Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of the Box Elder County Sch. Dist., 16 P.3d 533, 535 (Utah
2000) (uTo date, this court has expressly found three constitutional provisions to be selfexecuting: (1). . . article XII, section 18, providing for the liability of bank stockholders
(citation omitted), (2) article I, section 22, the Takings Clause (citing Colman)\ and (3)
article I, section 9, the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
(citation omitted).").
B.

A Self-Executing Clause is not Subject to Limiting or Contravening
Legislation such as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Unlike certain other rights that are born of statute, the rights deriving from a selfexecuting constitutional clause are effective and enforceable as is. In other words, "a
self-executing clause is one that can be judicially enforced without implementing
legislation," Spackman at 535. Thus, in the case at hand, subject matter jurisdiction over
Heughs Land's state takings claims is presumed to exist.

A - U 1 0 7 "»
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In Lynch v. Jacobsen. 184 P. 929, 933 (Utah 1919), the Court stated that "[i]t is all
too well settled to admit of controversy, although not always kept in mind by either
courts or counsel that where certain rights are granted or certain liabilities are imposed
by the Constitution, all that is intended thereby, unless otherwise expressed in the
instrument itself, is that the Legislature is bound by the constitutional provision as
written ...

such Constitutions are merely limitations upon the powers of the state

Legislatures." (emphasis added).
The obvious intent of a strict limitation on legislative power is to guarantee the
availability of certain, unimpeded constitutional rights. It follows that any legislation
aimed at self-executing constitutional rights can only further the exercise of such a
constitutional right and make it more available. See Colman at 630 ("[T]he delegates [to
the Constitutional Convention in 1895] assumed that article I, section 22 would be a
limitation on the state and that further legislation would provide no less protection than
that mandated by article 1, section 22." (emphasis added); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732,
738 (Utah 1996) (Courts may avoid legislation incongruous to self-executing
constitutional provisions); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 101 (2004) ("It is clear
that legislation which would defeat or restrict a self-executing mandate of the constitution
is beyond the power of the legislature.").
Based on these principles, the City of Holladay's argument that the legislative
restrictions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act apply to article I, section 22 must
fail
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First, the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act are,
by definition, "limiting" vis a vis the Takings Clause. Colman at 630 ("The issue is
whether an inverse condemnation claim under article I, section 22 is subject to the
limitations found in the Governmental Immunity Act.") (emphasis added); Farmers New
World at 1244 n.l ("An inverse condemnation claim under that constitutional provision
[article I, section 22] is self-executing and not subject to the limitations found in the
Governmental Immunity Act.") (emphasis added). As discussed above, self-executing
constitutional provisions may be broadened but not limited in any way by legislation.
Second, Utah courts have already determined that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act does not apply to article I, section 22 takings claims. See Colman. See
also Farmers New World at 1244 n.l ("An inverse condemnation claim under [article I,
section 22] is self-executing and not subject to the limitations found in the Governmental
Immunity Act); Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1996)
("[A]rticle I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing . . . [T]he Utah
Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, section 22 of the state constitution as allowing a
suit for inverse condemnation when the effect of an ordinance is to take or damage
private property at a level that gives rise to a constitutional claim.").
Numerous other jurisdictions specifically agree that state notice-of-claim statutes
cannot be applied to constitutionally-derived rights. Greenway Dev. Co., Inc. v. Borough
ofParamus, 750 A.2d 764, 770 (N.J. 2000) ("We are also persuaded that the notice
provision of the TCA does not apply to inverse condemnation claims . . .That
constitutional provision against unconstitutional takings is self-executing, in the sense
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that such claims arise independently of the TCA. Additionally, 'statutes [cannot]
abrogate constitutional rights.'(citation omitted)"); Moore Real Estate, Inc. v. Porter
County Drainage Bd. of Porter County, 578 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ([0]ur
constitution in Article 1, Section 21 requires that no person's property shall be taken by
law without just compensation. The Board may not use [the notice provisions of] a state
statute, the tort claims act, to trump the constitutional rights of Moore."); Wolff v. Sec'y of
the South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks DepL, 544 N.W.2d 531, 535 (S.D. 1996)
("Because the claim [for inverse condemnation] proceeds from a [state] constitutional
right... no notice of injury was required to bring the cause of action against the
Secretary."); Dishman v. Nebraska Public Power Dist, 482 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Neb.
1992) (Court refused to apply notice requirement of tort claims act to an action for
inverse condemnation because the state constitutional provision which prohibits the
taking of property without just compensation is self-executing).
Finally, the City of Holladay's claim that self-executing clauses are subject to
"procedural" legislation is unsupportable. The law simply does not make a "substantive"
versus "procedural" distinction with regard to the legislature's ability to regulate selfexecuting rights; rather, the law only makes a "limiting" versus "broadening" distinction.

1

In Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 152 (1988), the Supreme Court held that "a state court
may not decline to hear an otherwise properly presented federal claim because that claim
would be barred under a [Wisconsin] state law requiring timely filing of notice. State
courts simply are not free to vindicate the substantive interests underlying a state rule of
decision at the expense of the federal right." Several state courts have applied the
reasoning in Felder to render state notice-of-claim laws inapplicable in actions alleging
violations of federal as well as state constitutional rights, such as inverse condemnation.
See. e.g., Greenway Dev. at 770.
6/^107 2
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In other words, legislatures may broaden self-executing constitutional rights (either
substantively or procedurally), but may not in any way, even procedurally, limit those
rights. If subject matter jurisdiction of takings claims is conditioned upon compliance
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's notice-of-claim provisions, the legislation
would unconstitutionally limit a litigant's takings rights in a way that did not exist prior
to enactment of the statute in 1978.
The City of Holladay argues that courts require "strict compliance" with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirements. That may be true, but certainly
"strict compliance" can be required only where the underlying claim is subject to the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act in the first place. Heughs Land's very contention,
which is supported by Column, is that its constitutionally-based takings claims are
exempt from the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The City of Holladay holds out Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) in support of the City's distinction between "substantive" and "procedural"
immunity, claiming that "procedural" limitations on takings claims are permissible. The
case is inapposite for two reasons. First and most importantly, Nielson does not involve
article I, section 22 or any other self-executing constitutional provision. Because the law
is unique with regard to self-executing provisions, Nielson has no application to the facts
at hand. Second, the "substantive" and "procedural" distinction made in Nielson was
made within the context of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, i.e. the Act did apply.
The plaintiff in Nielson brought claims against a State employee. In attempt to avoid the
"procedural" notice-of-claim statute, the plaintiff claimed to sue the State employee in his
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individual capacity and not his capacity as a government employee. The court found that
the plaintiff was, in fact, basing his claims on conduct the employee engaged in while
performing his duties as a State employee. The court ultimately held that because the
ability of the plaintiff in Nielson to bring the claim at all was created by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act's waiver of sovereign or "substantive" immunity, the
legislature could clearly create and enforce any corresponding "procedural" notice-ofclaim requirements. In contrast, Heughs Land's takings claim is brought under the article
I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, and the legislature is constitutionally prohibited
from restricting or limiting self-executing rights.
II.

A DECISION WHICH PRECLUDES STATE COURT AS A PROPER
VENUE FOR LITIGATING FEDERAL TAKINGS CLAIMS
CONCURRENTLY WITH STATE TAKINGS CLAIMS IS IN DIRECT
CONTRAVENTION OF THE POLICY SET FORTH IN WILLIAMSON.
This Court must decide how to apply the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson

County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank when a plaintiff concurrently raises both
state and federal takings claims in state court.2
In Williamson, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent's claims as premature
for two reasons. First, the majority of the Court's ripeness analysis focused on the
absence of a final decision regarding the development of respondent's property. The
Court held that Williamson County Regional Planning Commission's 1981 disapproval
:

The Utah Supreme Court applied Williamson in Patterson v. American Fork City, 67
P.3d 466 (Utah 2003), but to a distinctly different set of facts than exist in the case at
hand. In Patterson, the plaintiff raised federal takings in state court, but raised no
concurrent state takings claims. Because of the plaintiffs failure to avail itself of state
inverse condemnation remedies, the Court could not hear the federal claims. In contrast,
Heughs Land has raised both state and federal takings claims in state court.
679107 2

7

of the respondent's plat did not constitute a final, reviewable decision given the
availability of a variance procedure that was not pursued by respondent. Second,
respondent raised only federal takings claims and failed to invoke available state inverse
condemnation remedies.
Because a final administrative decision had not been rendered, and in order to
promote the efficient use of judicial resources, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as
unripe. In doing so, the Supreme Court did not terminate the federal takings rights
guaranteed by the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution.3 Instead, the Court
indicated that for purposes of judicial economy, takings claims should preferably be
resolved on the merits in state court.
Following Williamson, numerous courts have embraced state courts as the sole,
proper venue for litigating both state and federal takings claims. See, e.g., Peduto v. City
of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1989); Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v.
City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1993); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of
County Comm 'rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10 n Cir. 1998); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport
Autk, 953 F.2d 1299 (11 th Cir. 1992); Rainey Bros. Constr. County v. Memphis and
Shelby Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997). These decisions
reason that even if a litigant cannot, under Williamson, assert federal takings claims in
federal court, that does not mean that a litigant could not assert those claims in state
court.
5

This is the result under a literal interpretation of Williamson, whereby a plaintiff is
precluded under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel from litigating
federal takings claims in federal court after litigating state takings claims in state court.
^"70107 ?
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The City of Holladay argues that jurisdiction over federal takings claims exists
only in federal court and must be preceded by a fully adjudicated state claim involving
the same operative facts. In theory, this either eliminates federal takings rights altogether
or results in two trials of the same case, which flies in the face of Williamson.
CONCLUSION.
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court for two reasons. First,
article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self-executing. Therefore, any right to
recover under that constitutional provision may not be modified or restricted in any way
by legislation such as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Second, the ripeness
doctrine set forth in Williamson only restricts the ability of a federal court to hear state
takings claims before state remedies have been exhausted. Williamson does not preclude
simultaneous determination by a state court of both state and federal claims. The
judgment of the district court should be reversed and this case should be remanded to the
district court for trial of both state and federal takings claims.

Anthony I^Rampton
Angel^E. Atkin
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Heughs Land, LLC
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